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THE PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANT IN
CALIFORNIA-A BETTER
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
On September 17, 1970, the Governor of California signed
Assembly Bill No. 2109.' This new law creates, but only partially
defines, a new category of paramedical personnel designated "phy-
sician's assistants" (hereinafter referred to as P.A.s). The bill has
been described as a "dramatic breakthrough in the area of legisla-
tion aimed at permitting wide use of allied health personnel capa-
bilities previously restricted."' The statute's impact is dramatic
because the functional role of the P.A. is left largely to the dis-
cretion of the California Board of Medical Examiners, whereas
the functions of most other paramedical personnel are limited by
statute.' The new scheme is only temporary as it is the intent of the
Legislature eventually to "establish a system of certifying or li-
censing physician's assistants so that the quality of the service is
insured."4 This comment will survey the advantages and disadvan-
tages, including the possible constitutional challenge, of the wide
discretion given the Board of Medical Examiners. It will compare
this temporary system with the traditional system of licensure, and
will, in addition, examine some P.A.-related malpractice problems.
It is this writer's conclusion that the basic scheme of the temporary
system discussed herein should be retained in the permanent P.A.
licensure system.
THE NEW LAW AND ITS BACKGROUND
The physician shortage should come as no surprise to the people
of California. In the special election of June 2, 1970, they defeated
Proposition 1, which would have provided needed funds for the
expansion of California medical schools.5 Even had Proposition 1
passed, it is apparent it would not have adequately met California's
share of the national shortage of one million health workers pre-
1 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2377.5, 2510-2522 (West Supp. 1971). The body of
the law is in sections 2510-2522 which constitute Article 18 of the Business and
Professions Code. Article 18 was added by Cal. Stats., ch. 1327, § 2, at 2584 (West
1970).
2 Brierly, The Physician's Assistant in Legal Limbo, PHYSICIAN'S MANAGEMENT,
January 1, 1971, at 28.
8 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1000-07, 2137, 2726 (West 1962).
4 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2510 (West Supp. 1971).
5 Proposition 1 as it appeared on the ballot: "FOR BONDS TO PROVIDE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA HEALTH SCIENCE FACILITIES. (This act
provides for a bond issue of Two hundred forty-six million three hundred thousand
dollars $246,300,000) ."
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dicted for 1975.6 This shortage is one of medical skills. If some
medical functions can be performed by new varieties of trained and
supervised personnel, then this shortage may be alleviated.' Cali-
fornia has turned to the P.A. as a partial solution.
The P.A. was created at Duke University in 1965.8 Since
then programs have been springing up prolifically throughout the
United States.9 The concept of the P.A. has included both the
generalist P.A., who would act as the general practitioner's "third
arm," to specialist P.A.s in fields ranging from midwifery to surgi-
cal assistance. Some of the operational programs have no im-
plementing or supporting legislation. However, it was not possible
to utilize P.A.s in California without implementing legislation.
In Magit v. Board of Medical Examiners, ° the court held that
the defendant doctor was guilty of employing an unlicensed person,"
and aiding and abetting the administration of an anesthetic by un-
licensed persons, 2 even though the unlicensed personnel were foreign
doctors of medicine with specialized training in anesthesiology-the
area in which they had been utilized. Although these foreign doctors
had been supervised by a licensed physician, the court stated:
In the absence of some statutory basis for an exception, such as those
with respect to nurses and persons engaged in medical study or teaching,
one who is not licensed to practice medicine or surgery cannot legally
perform acts which are medical or surgical in character, and supervision
does not relieve an unauthorized person from penal liability for the
violation of statutes which, like section 2141 of the code, prohibit the
unlicensed practice of medicine. 18
With the defeat of Proposition 1 and Magit's prohibition of the
delegation of tasks which are medical or surgical in character, the
need for legislative action became apparent.
Assembly Bill No. 2109 established a system whereby one or
more approved physicians may delegate tasks to a P.A. who is
specifically approved by the Board of Medical Examiners to func-
6 CALIFORNIA MEDICAL AssOCIATION, PHYSICIAN's ASISTANTs-A SoCIo-EcoNoaric
REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF RESEARCH AND PLANNING, CALIFORNIA MEDICINE 73 (1970).
7 Statement by Assemblyman Gordon Duffy, co-author of Assembly Bill 2109,
June 15, 1970.
8 Model Legislation Project for Physician's Assistants, conducted under Contract
No. HSM 110-69-242 with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, June
30, 1970, at 1, (hereinafter cited as Model Legislation Project).
9 See RN, October, 1970, at 43-46 for a complete listing of existing and proposed
programs as of that date.
10 57 Cal. 2d 74, 366 P.2d 816 (1961).
11 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2392 (West 1962).
12 Cal. Stats., ch. 414, § 6, at 1377 (1937) (repealed 1965).
1s Magit v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 74, 84, 366 P.2d 816, 820
(1961).
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tion under the supervision of the approved physician(s). The
guiding purposes behind the bill are to remedy the "shortage and
geographic maldistribution of health care services in California
. . " and "encourage the more effective utilization of the skills
of physicians . . . ." by providing for the delegation of tasks to
P.A.s.15 The Board of Medical Examiners is empowered to cer-
tify educational programs for P.A.s'8 which meet standards pub-
lished by the board. 7 A physician who desires to employ a P.A. must
submit an application to the Board of Medical Examiners.18 The
application must describe the qualifications of the proposed P.A.,
the background of the physician (s), and the way in which the P.A.
is to be utilized in the physician's practice.' 9 The Board will approve
applications where the proposed P.A. is a graduate of an approved
program and is "fully qualified by reason of experience and educa-
tion to perform medical services under the supervision of a licensed
physician."2
THE PROBLEM OF GEOGRAPHICAL MALDISTRIBUTION
As noted above, one of the basic purposes of the law is to
remedy the geographical maldistribution of health care services
in California." It might well be asked whether or not the law will
have such an effect. If P.A.s do find positions in rural areas, phy-
1 4 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2511(d), 2512, 2517 (West Supp. 1971).
15 Id. § 2510.
16 Id. § 2515(a).
17 Id. § 2515(c).
18 Id. § 2516.
19 Id. § 2516(a-c).
20 Id. § 2517.
21 For a county by county breakdown of the ratio of physicians to the general
population, see CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CALIFORNIA'S PHYSICIANS-DECEM-
BER 1966 THROUGH JULY 1969-A Socio-ECONoMIc REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF RE-
sEARCH AND PLANNING (January, 1970). The figures, as might be expected, show that
rural counties have a much lower ratio than urban counties. For instance, the number
of physicians per 100,000 persons, as of July, 1969, was 48.2 in Del Norte County,
48.3 in Glenn County and 53.2 in San Benito County as compared to 455.9 in San
Francisco County, 235.3 in Marin County and 183.8 in Los Angeles County. Concentra-
tions of hospitals in some counties (e.g., San Francisco County) partially account for
the high ratio. Presumably, however, a physician, whether or not associated with a
hospital, gives more service to the county, or at least the general area, in which he re-
sides than he does to outlying areas. Although there are no figures available, one may as-
sume that medical personnel are also maldistributed within the metropolitan areas, with
lower ratios in lower income areas, such as the "inner city." It might also be noted
that although from December, 1966 to July, 1969 there was an increase of 7.2 percent
in the total number of non-federal physicians practicing in California, there was a
0.9 percent decrease in the total number of general practioners during the same period.
For further breakdowns in the distribution of California physicians, see CALIFORNIA
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRmUTION OF PHYSICIANS IN CALI-
FORNIA-JuNE-JULY, 1969-A SOCIO-ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF RESEARCH
AND PLANNING (February, 1970).
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sicians, hopefully, will be free to spend more time on more demand-
ing and complex tasks. However, if a proportionately larger number
of P.A.s find positions in urban areas, then although the absolute
level of patient care may improve in both areas, little progress
will have been made in reducing the geographical maldistribution
of health care services. Hearings were held by the Board of Medical
Examiners for the purpose of gathering information and data re-
quired to implement the Physician's Assistant program.22 At those
hearings, the question was raised briefly whether, under the au-
thority of Article 18, P.A.s could be sent to those areas where the
major physician shortages exist.2" The subject was not pursued at
length. In addition to the controversy surrounding the subject, there
are several potential legal obstacles to the Board's exercising such
power. First, there is no specific provision in the bill authorizing
such an exercise of discretion by the Board. Even if legislation au-
thorizing a system of sending graduates of P.A. courses to particu-
lar areas were to be found constitutional, it is still possible that the
making of a similar regulation by the Board under the present law
would be an abuse of administrative discretion. The creation of
any system involving predetermination of the P.A.'s (or any other
professional's) location of practice would appear to be an important
change of policy. Generally, the legislature must fix basic policy,
while the administrative body simply "fills in the details. '24
Other problems may arise under the equal protection and due
process clauses of the United States Constitution. Assuming that
the P.A.s sent to particular areas would have lower incomes than
the P.A.s allowed to practice in other areas, there must be an equi-
table and random method of choosing those P.A.s in order to avoid
a violation of the equal protection clause.2" Some might claim that
a law that allows for predetermination of a P.A.'s place of practice
is a violation of the right to travel.20 Since a license to practice
medicine is a valuable property right, 7 it may be argued that such
an infringement on that right would be violative of due process.
However, the seriousness of the inequities involved with the
22 The hearings were held on February 19 and 20, 1971, in San Francisco and
March 1 and 2, 1971, in Los Angeles. For information concerning the transcripts, which,
as of this writing, are not generally available, contact the Board of Medical Examiners.
23 It may be argued that even if the Board does have the power under Article 18
to send P.A.s to particular areas, such a function could be better handled by the
legislature which is better equipped to assess the severity of maldistribution and
administer a program of redistribution.
24 California Employment Comm'n. v. Butte County Rice Growers' Ass'n., 25
Cal. 2d 624, 632, 154 P.2d 892, 895 (1944).
25 See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 32 (1884).
20 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
27 Hewitt v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39, (1906).
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orderless dispersal of health manpower cannot be overlooked. Per-
haps the easiest solution to the maldistribution problem would be
employment of more government physicians under the Public
Health Service or a similar agency.28 Federal or state legislative
action could remove the pressing needs that would otherwise tend
to shape judicial decisions. If the legislature does not act, strong
precedent could be found to support severe limitations on the licenses
of P.A.s, and other health care personnel, based upon the state's
police power. It has been held that private property and contract
rights must yield to necessary exercises of the state's police power.29
The police power is itself elastic and changes in scope according
to the social and economic needs of the day.30 The state may exercise
the police power in furtherance of the public health.3 The grant-
ing of a license confers no vested right and the licensee accepts
it subject to power of the state to impose further regulations. 2
This is not the place for a detailed perusal of this question. It is
enough to say that the issue may be reduced eventually to a bal-
ancing of the competing interests: the public health versus a
limitation on property interests and a certain loss of professional
freedom.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The discretion given the Board to approve physician's applica-
tions raises the possibility of an attack on the new law as an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power. The ability of the
Board to limit the scope of practice of P.A.s3 3 may also raise this
question. The problem is not with the federal Constitution. The
validity of powers delegated to the Board by the legislature is a
state constitutional question in so far as the separation of powers
doctrine is concerned. 4 There is no requirement in the federal Con-
stitution that state governmental powers be distributed in one par-
ticular manner. 3
28 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 254(b) (West 1969) which takes a step in this direction by
allowing the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to send Public Health
Service personnel to areas with "critical health manpower shortages."
29 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
80 Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
81 Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 554 (1905).
32 Compare Rosenblatt v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d
69, 158 P.2d 199 (1945) with Hewitt v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal.
590, 84 P. 39 (1906).
83 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2516(c) (West Supp. 1971).
84 See CAL. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
35 Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S.
505, 507 (1903) ; Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal. 2d 401, 189 P.2d
17 (1948).
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The basic requisite for a valid delegation of "sublegislative"
power to an administrative agency is that the legislature have the
necessary power to legislate. 6 There is no question that the legisla-
ture has the power to set qualifications and limit the functions of
medical personnel. 7 It has set qualifications for licensed medical
categories in California and limited the functions of all but the
physician who has an "unlimited license" to practice medicine. 8
Can the legislature constitutionally delegate these functions to the
Board of Medical Examiners?
Administrative agencies in California are limited in their powers
to those expressly conferred by statute or those which may reason-
ably be implied to carry out express authority. 9 In the past many
courts have required that the delegated powers be limited by mean-
ingful standards. The tendency during the past three or four decades,
however, has been to uphold delegations with vague standards or
even with no standards whatsoever.4" Although the California courts
may not have explicitly accepted this dilution of the separation of
powers doctrine,4' the cases show that the courts will permit state
agencies to exercise very broad powers, whatever the label put upon
them. The placing of power in an administrative agency, as opposed
to the legislature, is especially necessary where a profession is in-
volved and there is a requirement for expertise in the decision
making process.4" In such a case, the agency is made up of experts
(as is the California Board of Medical Examiners with eleven phy-
sicians out of the twelve members) 43 and is particularly able to deal
with the problem area.44 Because the field of public health is too
critical to be limited by the nebulous doctrine of the separation of
powers, California courts have consistently upheld the delegation
of broad powers to medical boards, even to the extent of allowing
the boards to set their own standards.45 Moreover, where the legis-
lature has set forth the purpose of the enactment, the declaration
36 East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. Department of Pub. Works, 1 Cal. 2d 476,
35 P.2d 1027 (1934) ; 35 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 85, 86 (1960).
37 Fuller v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 Cal. App. 2d 734, 59 P.2d 171
(1936).
38 Millsap v. Alderson, 63 Cal. App. 518, 219 P. 469 (1923).
39 Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 151 P.2d 505 (1944).
40 Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. 2d 557, 59 P.2d 119
(1966); Los Angeles v. Southgate, 108 Cal. App. 398, 291 P. 654 (1930); Davis v.
State Bd. of Optometry, 83 Cal. App. 488, 257 P. 197 (1927).
41 Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal. 2d 83, 113 P.2d 873 (1941); Jersey Maid Milk Prod.
Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1936).
42 Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, 335, 90 P. 702, 703 (1907).
43 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2100 (West 1962).
44 Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, 336, 90 P. 702, 703 (1907).
45 Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167, 77 P. 879 (1904); People v. Chong, 28 Cal.
App. 121, 151 P. 553 (1915).
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of purpose and policy may, in itself, provide a sufficient standard
to guide the agency. 46 To attack the delegation of powers to the
Board to judge applications and determine the scope of practice
of P.A.s would appear to be a reversal of the trend towards in-
creasing the power and discretion of administrative agencies. In
view of the special competence of the Board in these areas, the
rationale behind such a reversal is not apparent.
However, the new law is not wholly without standards. The
Board will approve applications by physicians only where the P.A.
is a graduate of an approved program and is qualified by "experi-
ence and education" to function under the supervision of the apply-
ing physician.47 Such a broad test leaves much discretion to the
Board, a necessity in an experimental scheme which is designed
to allow for innovative educational programs.48 Nevertheless, it is
a sufficient standard to ward off attacks on the law's constitutional-
ity.
Related to the Board's power to accept or reject applications
is its power to limit the tasks the P.A. may perform. As of this
writing, the Board has not published any of the regulations called
for by Article 18. There can be no doubt, however, that the Board
has the power to make regulations defining the P.A.s scope of prac-
tice. Besides specific authorizations to make regulations, 49 Article
18 includes a clause which authorizes the Board to make such regu-
lations as are "reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of
this article."5 This is a standard which may guide the Board in
determining a P.A.'s scope of practice. Physicians may delegate
tasks to P.A.s where "such delegation is consistent with the patient's
health and welfare."'" This standard, like the standard for accep-
tance of applications, is a broad one. However, where a board is
composed of professionals, the imposition of a rigid standard by
the legislature might rob the board of the discretion only it, not
the legislature, has the knowledge to exercise responsibly.
MALPRACTICE PROBLEMS
The creation of the P.A. will open new areas of possible mal-
practice liability for the supervising physician as well as the P.A.
himself. Some are relatively clear cut and may effectively be solved
46 Knudsen Creamery Co. v. Brock, 37 Cal. 2d 485, 234 P.2d 26 (1951).
47 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2517 (West Supp. 1971).
48 Id. § 2510.
49 Id. §§ 2515(c), 2516.
50 Id. § 2522.
51 Id. § 2510.
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by the Board's regulations. An example is the necessity of obtain-
ing the patient's consent to medical treatment. If a patient consents
to any treatment under the impression that he is being treated by
a physician when, in fact, he is being treated by a P.A., he may
claim his consent was based on a misrepresentation and was, there-
fore, vitiated. The result could be a suit for battery. 2 It is well
within the Board's power5" to require that P.A.s wear large badges
designating themselves as physician's assistants. It may even re-
quire that a statement of consent be signed, at least at the patient's
initial exposure to the P.A. Such regulations should effectively mini-
mize misunderstanding and the litigation which misunderstanding
invariably produces.
Other areas of possible malpractice litigation may not be as
conducive to simple solution. A P.A. may perform medical services
under the supervision of an approved physician. 4 But how immedi-
ate must the supervision be? Clearly, the physician need not always
be physically present.5 5 Routine tasks, such as the administration
of inoculations, are often performed by unsupervised nurses, and
could certainly be performed by unsupervised P.A.s. Other tasks,
such as suturing, may, depending on the situation, be routine or
quite complex. A third group of tasks, for example the delivery of
babies, may be considered so uniformly delicate that, if such a
task is ever delegated, the physician should always be physically
present.
A physician may be liable for the negligence of his assistants
and employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.56 He
must exercise due care in selecting his assistants. 7 May he also be
negligent in not exercising a sufficient degree of supervision over
a non-negligent assistant? If, for instance, a P.A. makes an error
in judgment that the physician would (or should) not make, can
the plaintiff claim that the physician was negligent in failing to
supervise the P.A. adequately? In such a case the required degree
of supervision would become an open question to be determined
by the surrounding circumstances and the custom and practice of
other physicians in supervising their P.A.s.5
52 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 106 (3d ed. 1964).
58 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2522 (West Supp. 1971).
54 Id. § 2512.
55 "The commonly accepted definitions of supervision and control do not require
continuous physical presence." 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 157, 158 (1964).
56 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Ales v. Ryan, 8
Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936).
57 Kennedy v. Gaskell, 274 Cal. App. 2d 244, 78 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1969).
58 See Chalmers-Francis v. Nelson, 6 Cal. 2d 402, 57 P.2d 1312 (1936), where
the court implied that, in light of existing custom and practice, a licensed nurse, acting
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This precise problem will not arise if the P.A. is held to the
same standard of care as the physician. If the physician would be
expected to handle the situation satisfactorily, then the P.A. would
also, and the physician would be liable under respondeat superior.
There are conflicting views on the standard of care to which the
P.A. should be held. Is the P.A. to be held to the same standard
of care as a physician, since he will be performing tasks traditionally
performed by the physician, or is he to be held to a lower standard
of care based on his lesser qualifications? If he is held to a lower
standard of care, does this suggest a net lowering of the quality
of care the patient will be receiving? If he is held to the same
standard of care, is this an accurate reflection of his skills as a P.A.?
Normally, medical personnel are held to that standard of learn-
ing and skill normally possessed by members of that same class of
personnel in the same or similar locality under the same or similar
conditions. 9 There are arguments in favor of a lower standard of
care for P.A.s than for physicians. To hold supervising physicians
responsible under respondeat superior for a very high P.A. standard
of care could increase the insurance rates which those physicians
employing P.A.s would be required to pay and, thereby, discourage
participation in the program by physicians.
Nevertheless, Article 18 provides strong reason to believe that
P.A.s should be held to the same standard of care as physicians.
P.A.s are to perform medical tasks where such performance would
be consistent with a patient's health and welfare. ° It seems unlikely
that the patient's health or welfare would benefit by being subjected
to a lower quality of medical care. Surely this is not what the
legislature intended. More likely, the intent of Article 18 is to free
physicians to concentrate on more complex tasks by allowing them
to delegate tasks which could be performed equally well by P.A.s. 1
To hold P.A.s to a lower standard of care than physicians would
be legal recognition of a lowering of the quality of care patients
under the direction and supervision of a licensed physician, may perform certain tasks
which, without such direction and supervision, would constitute the illegal practice of
medicine.
59 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161 (1964) ; Valentin
v. La Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P.2d 359 (1946) ; Williams v. Pomona
Valley Hosp. Ass'n., 21 Cal. App. 359, 131 P. 888 (1913). However, as means of com-
munication and transportation improve, the locality rule is diminishing in importance.
Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
60 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2510 (West Supp. 1971).
61 "Many physicians will tell you that some of the things they do can be per-
formed by other well-trained and well-supervised persons." Statement by Assembly-
man Gordon Duffy, co-author of Assembly Bill 2109, June 15, 1970. The implicit
rationale behind this statement is that these particular tasks can be performed equally
well by P.As.
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would be receiving. This would also remove a stimulus, which would
otherwise be present, for the attainment of excellence in P.A. train-
ing programs. By holding the P.A. to the same standard of care
as the physician, the doctrine of respondeat superior should work
to maximize supervision. A physician will delegate only where he
is sure the P.A. can do a physician-like job, and he will supervise
carefully to make sure the P.A. is performing capably.
The question of the standard of care to which the P.A. should
be held is therefore implicitly answered in Article 18. Under the
authority of section 2522,62 which gives the Board the power to
adopt such regulations as are reasonably necessary to carry out
the purposes of the Article, the Board should include in its regula-
tions a requirement that a physician delegate tasks only where the
P.A. can perform as competently as the physician. The Board could
even go so far as stating explicitly that the P.A. is to be held to the
same standard of care as the physician.' Even if the Board should
not regulate so explicitly, the legislative intent behind Article 18 is
clear. To hold the P.A. to a lower standard of care would be to
ignore that intent.
THE PERMANENT SYSTEM
Section 2520(f) of Article 18 states that the Board shall, prior
to January 1, 1972, submit to the legislature recommendations for
establishing a permanent program of certification or licensure for
P.A.s. It is this writer's conclusion that, with minor modifications,
the scheme set forth by Article 18 should be maintained as the
permanent system. The basic alternative to Article 18 is the trad-
itional system of licensure. Such a system would include a statutory
definition of the general functions the P.A. is to perform and of
the educational requirements that must be met. The State Medical
Practice Act64 lists the requirements for the licensing of physicians.
Included are a detailed specification of the medical school cur-
riculum65 and a listing of general subjects to be covered in the exam-
ination conducted by the Board. 6 A physician's scope of practice is
left openended. He may use "any and all other methods in the
treatment of diseases, injuries, deformities, or other physical or
mental conditions."67 Other medical personnel are subject to stat-
utory limitations on their functions. A chiropractor is precluded
62 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2522 (West Supp. 1971).
63 See text accompanying notes 36-51, supra.
64 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2000-2545 (West 1962).
65 Id. § 2192 (West Supp. 1971).
66 Id. § 2288.
67 Id. § 2137 (West 1962).
[Vol. 12
from practicing medicine, 8 as are nurses69 and laboratory techno-
logists. 70
The rationale behind the traditional system is that it provides
a guarantee that the licensed individual is competent to perform
in the limited area prescribed by statute. There are drawbacks to
such a system, however. 7 The licensed individual may be very
competent to perform functions not included under the strict stat-
utory definition of his medical category. The valid question of the
competence of the individual to perform a given task is thus con-
verted into the question of whether it is legal for him to perform the
task.7 2 Moreover, members of the various licensed occupational
groups tend to guard jealously the functions statutorily limited to
their medical speciality.73 The traditional licensing system may also
limit career mobility. Where the system includes strict educational
prerequisites, an individual with a particular license may be required
to start at the very bottom of the educational ladder in order to
meet the specific requirements of the more advanced medical spe-
ciality he wishes to pursue. He may receive very little, if any, credit
for his previous education and experience.' 4 In addition, the detailed
descriptions of required curricula in some licensure systems
75 make
no provision for rapidly changing educational needs. New tech-
nology, scientific progress, and changing patterns of medical care
demand a flexible educational system.76 Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that an individual, once licensed, remains qualified. No
state attempts to prevent educational obsolescence by requiring
some kind of continuing education of physicians.
77 Few states re-
quire more than an application for reinstatement in the case of a
lapsed license.7"
In sum, despite the safeguards it provides, the traditional sys-
tem of licensure may deter a realistic allocation of medical tasks,
inhibit career mobility, tend to create rigid educational systems,
and provide an unreliable guarantee of competence.
68 Id. § 1000-07.
69 Id. § 2726.
70 Id. § 1240 (West Supp. 1971).
71 Model Legislation Project, supra note 8, at 9-13.
72 Hershey, An Alternative to Mandatory Licensure of Health Professionals,
HOSPITAL PROGRESS, March, 1969 at 72.
73 Id. at 73.
74 Model Legislation Project, supra note 8, at 12.
75 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2192 (West Supp. 1971).
76 Forgotson and Cook, Innovations and Experiments in Uses of Health Man-
power-The Effect of Licensure Laws, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 731, 738 (1967).
77 Forgotson, Roemere, and Newman, Licensure of Physicians, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q.
249, 276.
78 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2376.5 (West Supp. 1971).
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Article 18 is a step away from the rather rigid licensure systems
of the past. It gives the Board of Medical Examiners discretion
to allow for needed flexibility in educational programs and task
allocations. In fact, one of the stated purposes of the act is to allow
for "innovative development" of educational programs.79 The act
recognizes the desirability of promoting career mobility by encour-
aging the use of equivalency testing. 0 It allows for individualized
scope of practice based on the experience and education of the
particular P.A."
A major factor in the irrelevance of traditional licensure is
the existence of other quality controls-program accreditation is
most important-which did not exist when the licensure system
originated.82 Since the accrediting board, through supervision and
controls, can remove any doubt that the particular educational
program is valid, somewhat less weight may be given to initial
competence and more weight may be given to the continuing rele-
vance of the system.
In attempting to find an appropriate system for the P.A., the
legislature was almost forced to innovate. If the P.A. was to fulfillhis role as the physician's "third arm," his range of functions could
not be arbitrarily limited. Each physician would use his P.A. ac-
cording to his individual needs and practice. But, at the same time
some control had to be exercised over the P.A. in the interest of
the public's health and safety.
In determining what system would be used, the legislature had
a number of possibilities. Four states have statutes allowing for
delegation of tasks to trained personnel as long as supervision is
exercised by a physician or other licensed practicioners8 3 Such stat-
utes leave the question of the validity of the delegation solely to
79 Id. § 2510.
80 Id. § 2515(b) provides that the board will consider the results of equivalency
and proficiency testing and that "full credit" will be given to trainees for past educa-tion and experience in health fields. Since many of the potential P.A.s are medical
corpsmen and nurses, it was felt that the law should allow them to receive credit
according to their present skills and degree of knowledge. The question may arise
whether a candidate can score high enough on the equivalency tests to fulfill the re-quirements of an approved program without actually taking any courses under thatprogram. The credibility of the tests would be lessened if "full credit" were not in-
terpreted literally. The Board of Medical Examiners has the responsibility of approving
training programs for P.A.s. Therefore it must also have the responsibility for ap-proving equivalency tests which may take the place of a part or all of an approved
program. Once approved, these tests should be fully honored.
81 Id. §§ 2516(c), 2517.
82 Model Legislation Project, supra note 8, at 13.
83 ARIZONA REv. STAT. § 32-1421 (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. § 91-1-6(3) (m)(1963); KANSAS STAT. § 65-2872(g) (1964); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 492 (Supp. 1968-
1969).
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the courts and offer minimal protection to the patient and the respon-
sible physician. 4 Another possibility was the creation of a "Commit-
tee on Health Manpower Innovations," which would be responsible
for approving and defining new categories of paramedical person-
nel.8 Such a system would eliminate the need of going to the leg-
islature for approval of each new category of personnel, but the great
discretion given to the committee might leave it open to criticism
as a policy-making agency. 6
The scheme which was eventually selected by the California
legislature allows for more control than would a statute merely
providing for general delegation of duties. The Board of Medical
Examiners acts as the basic supervising agency and provides a first
line of control before the courts. The new law creates an "Advisory
Committee on Physician's Assistant Programs,"8 " but the Commit-
tee is "advisory" to the Board and has no specific independent
powers. The success or failure of the new system obviously will
depend on the ability of the Board of Medical Examiners to carry
out its assigned functions.
The primary rationale for placing discretion in the Board is
its flexibility and ease of action as compared to the legislature,
and as noted above, 8 the concentration of expert knowledge neces-
sary to informed decision-making. The Board itself is immune from
tort liability, 9 so its members may make their decisions based solely
on their professional opinions. Of course, potential P.A.s would have
the right to relief from unfair Board decisions through the writ of
mandate, 90 so Board decisions could not be arbitrary. Perhaps the
greatest drawback to such intensive use of the Board would be the
demands on the members of the Board who maintain their practices
while serving. The Advisory Committee on Physician's Assistant
Programs should provide some help. If this problem were to become
too severe, the best solution might be to provide for full-time Board
members with appropriate salaries.
Because of the almost unlimited discretion vested in the Board,
certain questions arise as to the Board's particular powers under
Article 18. In theory, Article 18 can provide an even greater guaran-
tee of initial competence than the traditional system of licensure,
84 Model Legislation Project, supra note 8, at 24.
85 Id. at 21.
86 Barbier v. Connally, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1884).
87 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2519 (West Supp. 1971).
88 See text accompanying note 42, supra.
89 CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 818.4 (West 1966).
90 See Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal. 2d 790, 136 P.2d 304 (1943);
King v. Board of Medical Examiners, 65 Cal. App. 2d 64, 151 P.2d 282.
19721
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
since the scope of practice can be limited to suit the skills of the
particular P.A.91 But the submitted and approved scope of practice
of the P.A. need not necessarily limit the P.A.'s functions. Section
251092 states that a physician may delegate tasks to his P.A. where
such delegation is consistent with the patient's health and welfare.
Whether or not the P.A. is limited to the approved functions in the
physician's application is a question within the discretion of the
Board of Medical Examiners. The argument in favor of allowing
maximum flexibility in the certification system is that the P.A. should
not be limited by the physician's description of the P.A.'s probable
functions. Section 2516 does not specifically state that these func-
tions are the only ones that the P.A. can perform. It simply calls for
a description of the "way in which the assistant or assistants are to
be utilized."9 " Moreover, Section 2510 states specifically that tasks
may be delegated "where such delegation is consistent with the pa-
tient's health and welfare." The liability of the physician under
respondeat superior will act as a sufficient motive for the physician
to delegate only where he is sure the P.A. is competent. Since the
underlying rationale behind Article 18 is to provide needed flexi-
bility94 in an experimental program, it would be inconsistent to limit
the P.A. to any prearranged scope of tasks. It can also be argued
that it would be almost impossible to list all the tasks the P.A. is
qualified to perform.
The argument favoring more built-in safeguards is that some
definite limit should be put on the P.A.'s range of functions. This
can be done by limiting him to those functions listed by the phy-
sician in his application9" and subsequently approved by the Board.
Should the P.A. increase his skills, the physician could submit a
new list of functions to the Board for its approval. This, hopefully,
would require the physician to consider each potential function of
the P.A. prior to the time of actual delegation. It would also allow
the Board to exercise its discretion. In addition to allowing the
physician to submit a new list of functions whenever appropriate,
the Board might also require the physician to submit a list of the
P.A.'s functions periodically. This would be another means, in ad-
dition to vicarious liability, of requiring the physician to consider
thoughtfully the P.A.'s role. The Board may also feel that, at least
to begin with, there should be some limitations placed upon the P.A.
91 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2516(c), 2517 (West Supp. 1971).
92 Id. § 2510.
98 Id. § 2516(c).
94 See text accompanying notes 65-82, supra.
95 This can be justified under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2510 (West 1962),
by concluding that delegation of duties not approved by the board would be incon-
sistent with the patient's health and welfare.
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Such limitations could be useful as a record of the P.A.'s skills. It
also would be a definite means of restricting P.A.s from areas where
they have little skill. Many of the projected P.A. education pro-
grams are for specialists (e.g., pediatrician's assistant, surgical as-
sistant). The P.A. could be limited to this speciality by limiting
his scope of practice.
Should the Board decide to limit the P.A.'s functions in advance,
the P.A. would presumably be guilty of the illegal practice of med-
icine and the physician of unprofessional conduct,96 if the P.A. per-
formed outside the approved sphere. A listing of functions would
probably have no malpractice implications in California.97
CONCLUSION
A system similar to Article 18, giving broad discretion to the
Board of Medical Examiners, can provide varying degrees of con-
trol over the P.A. Therefore, when the legislature considers what
system should be made permanent, it need not assume that such
a system need be any less protective to the public's health and wel-
fare than a system of traditional licensure.
The basic scheme of Article 18 should be retained by the leg-
islature. Some changes will be required. But the concept of moving
away from the inflexible traditional licensure system is valid.99
Rather than remaking Article 18 in the likeness of the traditional
system, the legislature may well consider remaking other licensure
statutes in the likeness of Article 18.
Brian L. Carr
96 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2377.5 (West Supp. 1971).
97 See Barber v. Reinking, 68 Wash. 2d 122, 411 P.2d 861 (1966), in which the
Washington court found a presumption of negligence against a physician who delegated
a task to a licensed practical nurse, where the particular task was a statutory task of
professional nurses. But more states hold that mere absence of license is in itself no
evidence of negligence. McDonald v. Foster Memorial Hosp., 170 Cal. App. 2d 85, 338
P.2d 607 (1959); Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926); Grier v.
Phillips, 230 N.C. 672, 55 S.E.2d 485 (1949).
Practicing without a license may be grounds for penal sanctions, however. See
text accompanying notes 10-12, supra.
98 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2514 (West Supp. 1971) restricts the P.A. from
performing services in the areas of measuring vision, fitting lenses or frames, and
dentistry and dental hygiene. These limitations are inconsistent with Article 18, under
which a P.A. could perform complicated tasks if he acts under the supervision of an
approved physician (assuming no other limitations by the Board).
99 As of this writing, bills modeled on A.B. 2109 have been introduced in at least
two states (Michigan and Florida), testifying to the common need of finding a
better system.
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